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Purpose – This paper presents exploratory, empirical data from a 3-year 
study of organisational culture in for-profit, employee-owned businesses 
within the UK, comparing ownership types (direct, trust and cooperative). 
It outlines the study and then focuses on worker cooperatives. Culture is 
illuminated through the lens of performance and reward management. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Qualitative data was gathered from 
three worker cooperatives based in the North of England, using semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and document review and 
was compared to qualitative data collected from other types of 
employee-owned business. 
 
Findings – The findings suggest a distinct culture within worker 
cooperatives encompassing five key values: a whole life perspective, 
consistently shared values, self-ownership, self-control and secure 
employment. 
 
Research limitations/implications – Additional time with each 
cooperative and a greater spread of cooperatives would be beneficial. 
The research was carried out during a period of organisational growth 
for the case organisations which may influence attitudes to reward and 
retention management. 
 
Practical implications – The results inform recruitment and retention 
policy and practice within worker cooperatives and highlight concerns 
regarding the stresses of being a self-owner. These are important 
considerations for potential worker co-operatives alongside policy 
recommendations to advance employee ownership.  
 
Originality/value – A comparative analysis of culture, performance and 
rewards across different employee ownership types has not been 
undertaken before. This addresses an under researched area of 
employee ownership regarding HR practices. Within the UK, recent 
research on the culture(s) of worker cooperatives is limited. 
 
Keywords: organisational culture, employee ownership, worker 
cooperative, performance management, reward management 
 




The Culture of UK Employee-owned Worker Cooperatives.  
Introduction 
This paper offers an empirical account and comparative analysis of organisational 
culture within employee-owned businesses (EOBs), with particular attention to 
worker cooperatives (WCs). It is the first paper of a wider study that explores 
variations of culture across three dominant types of EOBs within the UK (XXXX, 
YYYY). The ownership types are: worker cooperatives - enterprises where workers 
exclusively own and control a co-operative business; directly-owned - where shares 
are personally owned by employees, and trust-owned - where shares are owned on 
behalf of employees through a perpetual trust (Pendleton and Robinson, 2015). The 
aim for the wider study was to investigate the effect employee ownership (EO) has 
upon organisational culture. From there, a narrower focus emerged on how the WCs 
organisational culture varies from the other types of EO. 
This study is important because it is a unique comparative analysis of EO cultures 
through the lens of performance and reward. EO is under-researched. Although 
much has been written on culture and HR practice, its application within EOBs is less 
known (Wright, 2010; Nuttall, 2012). Pierce and Rodgers (2004) cite a lack of 
understanding of different forms of ownership and Kalmi (2007) highlights the 
neglect of scholarship on the impact of alternative forms of shareholding in the UK 
that might support radical approaches to employment relations (Fox, 1966). 
There has been an increasing interest in EO (Lampel, 2012). Sauser (2009, p. 163) 
said, ‘the employee-owned company is a concept whose time has come' and Nuttall 
(2013) states the UK is experiencing a decade for EO. In 2012, it was the UN “Year 
of the Co-operatives” and the UK government expressed a desire to increase EO. 
This is important as cooperative start-ups are almost twice as likely to survive the 
first five years of operation compared to companies and yet they remain “the best 
kept business secret” (Co-operatives UK, 2018). Cooperatives follow a set of seven 
principles declared by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) (ICA, 2014): 
voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic 
participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; 
cooperation amongst cooperatives and; concern for community. 
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The “Nuttall Report into Employee Ownership” (Nuttall, 2012) investigated barriers to 
EO and identified the two primary obstacles as lack of awareness and 
disadvantageous tax implications. It also recommended further research in EO 
(Recommendation N, p. 9), which would assist social entrepreneurs to create EOBs 
as well as founder-owners contemplating a transition into EO (BIS, 2013). By 
researching culture(s), this paper contributes to emerging debates on EO and 
enhances our understanding of how EOBs operate. The research question asks: 
How can attitudes to performance and reward management in worker 
cooperatives contribute to an understanding of the impact of EO on 
organisation culture? 
Performance and reward are used to illuminate the cultures. This is appropriate as 
performance is rewarded, creating a virtuous cycle of behaviour (Armstrong, 2012) 
and specifically within for-profit EOB, employees receive a share of the surplus as a 
reward. Performance management can impact culture by defining what is acceptable 
or not (Bach, 2005). Co-ownership can influence the performance of employees who 
have a personal interest in the profitability of their organisation. 
This paper has four sections. It examines the current literature and then explains the 
research methodology. The five themes identified are explored and then the 
conclusions apply the findings to questions about the operationalisation of WCs. 
Future papers will report findings on other EO types (direct- and trust-owned) and 
explore findings common to all three EO types. 
Literature 
Erdal (2011) positions EO as a response to the issues raised by Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010), Norton and Ariely (2011) and Stiglitz (2013) regarding the growth and 
impact of inequality in society. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) suggest a causal link 
between income inequality and a variety of social and health problems. Erdal (2011, 
p. 139) views the employment contract in a conventional firm as an agreement 
through which “the employee is rented”. Employees do not benefit from the 
organisation’s profitability as owners do, receiving limiting wages and benefits that 
perpetuate inequalities at work. In comparison, EO ensures employee-owners 
receive a share of all ‘gains’ that accrue to workers through enterprise ownership 
(Lewis, 1954).  
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Stiglitz (2013) suggests that income inequality stifles economic growth as the 
greatest proportion of earnings goes to a tiny minority and employees do not have 
the spending power to regenerate the economy. In the USA, 1% of the population 
own 50% of the wealth (Norton and Ariely, 2011) hence Blasi et al. (2014) propose 
taxation changes and greater information regarding EO that would reduce inequality. 
Austin (2014) calls for the expansion of WCs in New York, to cope with 
“unprecedented levels of income inequality” after observing dramatic wage increases 
(150% in a few years for low earners through WCs).  
The three tenets of EO within for-profit EOBs are: the distribution of the surplus 
amongst the owners (employees); a degree of employee control through voice 
mechanisms, and; the right to information (Pierce et al., 1991). Concerning 
organisational performance, ownership on its own is insufficient; it also requires 
participatory management (Thompson et al., 2013). With all three tenets working 
together, EO facilitates the distribution of the surplus amongst the employees as well 
as moderating wage differentials through informed employee voice mechanisms. 
This is observed at the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation, where the ratio of 
highest paid to lowest has always been less than 10:1 and averages 5:1 (Ridley-Duff 
and Bull, 2015, p. 4) and the John Lewis Partnership (2019, p. 76), where the limit 
was 25:1 until a vote of the partners increased it to 75:1 (currently 66:1). This 
compares favourably to the ratio based on FTSE 100 CEO’s average earnings 
(£5.7m) and the average employee’s earnings (£29,009) which rose from 162:1 to 
195:1 in the last year (CIPD, 2018). Berry and Bell (2018) see WCs as a form of 
protection for impoverished and marginalised workers in precarious work as it can 
provide economic empowerment. They too call for an ecosystem of WCs (ICA 
principle 6). 
Thompson et al. (2013) explain EO can motivate individuals by satisfying their higher 
order needs. This, in turn, leads to a desire for the EOB to succeed, as it becomes a 
shared goal. Hence, they suggest that HRM should consider EO for its impact on 
performance at an organisational level, although it is contested (Summer and 
Chillas, 2019). The governance of EOBs enables employees a greater say in 
managing and using culture as a valuable resource. Although Grey (2013) is scornful 
of “culture management”, suggesting that it is used to implement senior management 
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goals, although EO provides new ‘critical-side’ mechanisms to determine the goals 
and who benefits (Lewis, 1954). 
Organisational culture is a contested concept with many nuanced definitions. For 
example, Martin (2002) lists ten definitions in addition to her own. Many authors base 
their work around Schein’s (2010) understanding of culture being composed of three 
levels – artefacts, espoused beliefs, values and basic underlying assumptions. 
Ogbonna and Harris (2002, p674) define it as: 
 “the dynamic set of assumptions, values and artefacts whose meanings are 
collectively shared in a given social unit at a particular point in time” 
but Davis (in Martin, 2002, p. 57), takes it further to recognise that beliefs and values 
“provide them with the rules for behaviour in their organization”. Therefore, this 
research explored culture through the underlying values in performance and reward 
systems and the impact they have on the perceptions of employee owners. 
Grey (2013, p. 68), quoting Smircich, sees culture, either as a “critical variable” that 
can be managed (Grey suggests “manipulated”) or a “root metaphor” where an 
organisation is a culture - “spontaneous, unmanaged, just the way things are”, a 
symbolic view, which can include conflict, feminist and critical perspectives (Martin, 
2002). This research furthers understanding of the cultures of different types of 
EOBs, accepting that it is a variable that can be managed. Hence an integrationist 
view of culture was selected, assuming a dominant culture rather than multiple sub-
cultures (differentiated view) or a fragmented, post-modern view of culture (Martin, 
2002). Ybema (1997) concurs that the stance taken depends upon the purpose of 
the research. In this case, the research is pragmatic; to enhance understanding and 
make suggestions for effective working within the EO sector. Although sub-cultures 
are clearly acknowledged, this paper takes a high-level view of different forms of 
ownership. This provides an overdue update to past studies by Rothschild and Whitt 
(1986) and Bernstein (1980) on WCs in the USA and Whyte and Whyte's (1988) and 
Cheney’s (1999) studies of Mondragón Cooperatives. 
Whilst comparative studies have looked at the organisational level performance of 
EOBs (e.g. Lampel et al., 2012), this study focuses on the performance of the 
individual. Armstrong (2015, p9) describes performance management as: 
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"the continuous process of improving performance by setting individual and 
team goals which are aligned to the strategic goals of the organization, 
planning performance to achieve the goals, reviewing and assessing 
progress, and developing the knowledge, skills and abilities of people."  
This is a holistic view of the organisation and its employees, working together 
towards strategic goals and recognises the centrality of people. It positions 
performance management as a facilitator of cultural change through the ability to 
define core competencies and then evaluate employees’ abilities against them , using 
rewards to establish preferences (Bach, 2005). EO affords employees a voice to 
determine goals and who benefits, hence EO has the potential to alter the behaviour 
of employees who have a personal interest in the well-being of the organisation. 
Armstrong (2015) makes a connection between culture and performance and 
therefore the way that employees behave (see Davis’ definition early in Martin 2002). 
Whilst EO in a for-profit organisation leads to employees sharing the financial 
surplus (Lewis, 1954), rewards are not limited to financial pay-outs. Non-financial 
rewards can also be important. These can take the form of both extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards such as job challenge, responsibility, autonomy and task variety 
(Armstrong, 2012). Employers should consider the “total reward” concept which 
includes everything that employees value (Kaplan, 2005). It consists of four 
elements; Compensation (pay, bonuses), Benefits (health cover, gym), Development 
(learning, personal growth) and the Work Environment (job design, work/life 
balance). Employee owner voice mechanisms can help to determine which rewards 
are utilised. 
Methodology  
To understand organisational culture, a qualitative, inductive approach was taken 
(Gill and Johnson, 2010) using a neo-empiricist stance (Clark, 2014). The wider 
study, looking into culture across the three types of ownership (cooperative, direct 
and trust), was split into two phases. Phase 1 provided a topical understanding of 
performance and reward management methods in a cross-section of EOBs 
representing each type. Phase 2 was an in-depth study of a smaller number of 
EOBs' culture allowing for a richer picture of each ownership type. All the EOBs had 
to be for-profit, with at least 20 employees, have employee participation and been 
trading for at least two years. 
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Phase 1 included eight semi-structured interviews across the ownership types with 
either an HR representative, founder or business manager involved in performance 
and reward management. Two interviews were conducted in WCs, five in directly-
owned and one in a trust-owned EOBs. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Phase 2 included periods of ethnographic-style research in each of the ownership 
types. This enabled planned and ad-hoc semi-structured interviews (134 in total) 
alongside participant observation recorded in journals. It was possible to build a 
collection of documentary evidence (e.g. company websites, sales brochures and 
employee guidelines). Permission was granted for unrestricted site access, from the 
basement to the roof garden. Appointments were made with specific role holders (as 
in Phase 1) alongside approaches to employees at their workstation. 
A month of ethnographic-style study was carried out in the direct and trust-owned 
EOBs. However, prior to attending the WC, the hosting member cancelled due to a 
lack of time and instead two WCs (one of which was from phase 1) were visited for 
intensive interviews and observation. These took place both on and off site and 
included a Quarterly General Meeting (QGM). These WCs had a high degree of 
commonality: both were located in the North of England, had single site locations, a 
common market sector (food wholesale and retail) and significant periods of trading 
(over fifteen years). They are cited as exemplars of cooperative working, and 
between them have received national awards from both the UK cooperative 
community and Employee Ownership Association. Contact took place between 
December 2013 and July 2014. See Table 1 for information on the WCs. 
<Table 1 goes here> 
The primary data (audio recordings, interviews and observations notes, pictures, 
company documents and websites) was digitised and loaded into NVivo 10. It was 
analysed using the general inductive approach for qualitative data (Thomas, 2006). 
All data items from both phases were coded twice to ensure emerging nodes were 
identified in earlier sources. Nodes that were common to all three ownership types 
were then excluded to identify nodes that were either unique to one type (or shared 
with only one other type). Themes were then identified for each EO type. The next 




Based on the analysis of performance and reward in the WCs, five significant 
themes of organisational culture were recognised, which were not common to all the 
ownership types (cooperative, direct and trust). These were: a whole life perspective, 
consistently shared values, self-ownership, self-control and secure employment. 
Whole life perspective 
For all the members interviewed, in all three cases, being a member of a WC was 
much more than just being an employee - it was a way of life. The research affirms 
the finding of Rothschild and Whitt (1986) that WCs’ flatter (less hierarchical) 
management/governance structures enable people to present themselves, and 
perform their roles, in authentic ways. The cooperative model provided the greatest 
opportunity to personally manage work/life balance, primarily because less division 
was made between the two. Work blended into life at a fundamental level rather than 
being framed as a discrete “add on” to be held in check. Members were freely able to 
express themselves and their ideas rather than adopt a corporate persona/uniform 
seen elsewhere (particularly in more hierarchical trust-owned EOBs). The value was 
more than work-life balance, and perhaps - more appropriately – could be framed as 
work-life integration. All staff were able to express their opinions but only members 
had democratic participation at work, taking a step towards Ellerman’s (1997) vision 
of economic democracy in society. One employee in Coop 2 expressed it this way: 
I feel like we are all very different people but there seems to be a common 
thread, like in valuing time and travel, life aside from work. I feel like this style 
of work does fit in a bit more with your character, you don’t suppress yourself 
until the weekend, like a lot of jobs do. You put your Monday hat on, we don’t 
do that. (Coop2, employee 5). 
Flexibility around work scheduling was a significant reward and facilitated integration 
of employment with life choices. This could be a bespoke work pattern (term time 
only, early/late shifts or restricted days) or enabling members to be absent with 
extended periods of leave, paid and unpaid (up to a year at Coop1), still having a job 
to return to, thus guaranteeing employment.  
This flexibility aided retention and turnover rates were very low, around 1% for 
Coop1 and 3% for Coop2, although this figure is for members, rather than all 
workers. These findings are remarkable given CIPD findings that employee turnover 
has been estimated at 29% in the grocery retail industry (where Coop2 works) and 
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21% for the wider food industry (where Coop1 works) (see CIPD, 2004, p. 23). Both 
cases, therefore, reported lower staff turnover than private sector comparators as 
well one of the trust-owned EOBs in this study (which reports its ‘lower’ turnover as 
“25% of the industry average” – around 5%).  
This “Whole Life” perspective included respondents actively engaging outside of the 
organisation and recognising their impact on the community and globally (ICA 
principle 7). Resources were provided to the local community (e.g. free apples for 
children promoting healthy eating) as well as ethical sourcing. It included paying a 
salary above minimum wage level and distributing the surplus to members who then 
contributed to society via taxes (rather than claiming tax credits). This facilitated their 
financial independence. As Austin (2014) found, if wages do not cover living costs, 
then the organisation is externalising costs to the employee and society. Whilst 
internalising these externalities comes notionally at additional cost, staff retention 
and higher performance levels reduce costs. 
All members interviewed believed that cooperative working was beneficial and 
therefore wanted to assist in the creation of further cooperatives (ICA principle 6) 
(Co-operatives UK, 2018). They agreed with the cooperative principles, not doing so 
prevented membership. Only a small group of probationary/temporary workers opted 
for fixed wages and the flexibility of temporary work. The finding was confirmed by 
members relating their positive experiences of cooperative working through 
comparisons with previous experiences in non-cooperative organisations:  
“I took a 50% pay cut [to join Coop2] and I am over twice as happy, so it 
worked out!”  (Coop2, member 6).  
 “I think the best thing is feeling that you work for your own, for your 
interests... That is what keeps people here, I think it changes everything when 
you don’t have a kind of organisation with a different hierarchy… controlling 
people’s lives. People here have more control of their life, the independence 
of managing your time and your life work.” (Coop1, member 2). 
Recognition of life external to work was demonstrated in members actively being told 
to leave at the end of their shift rather than hang around to help, even when it was 
busy (Coop2) or given permission to go home if there was no work to do, either paid 
(Coop Service) or unpaid (Coop1) (This was not observed at direct or trust-owned). 
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Jaumier (2016) documented this in his experience of a WC, where it was recognised 
as being “badly organised” if members exceeded their allotted hours. 
“you are not expected to work overtime. If you are rota'd 9-to-5, you work nine 
till five.” (Coop2, member 6).  
“you can go home at 3 o’clock if you’ve got nowt to do”. (Coop Service, 
Company secretary). 
Consistently shared values 
All members interviewed exhibited a high degree of shared values, highlighting a 
strong culture where “values and norms are widely and deeply shared” (Thompson 
et al., 2013). This was initiated by the recruitment process which was frequently 
through word of mouth and brand alignment. All the WCs enforced a probationary 
period for potential members (from seven months to one year) during which they had 
to demonstrate their character and ability. This is a crucial stage in the process of 
adopting the existing culture (Schein, 2010) and demonstrating required 
performance levels. 
 “We put people through, say a nine months trial membership program which 
is very expensive, I think it cost us in the region of 10 grand [£10k] per 
person.”  (Coop1, member 3). 
In Coop1 and Coop2, probationers would undertake a variety of roles and their 
performance was reported to the membership. In all three WCs, a vote of the entire 
membership was taken to determine whether to admit the employee as a member. If 
not approved, employment was terminated (otherwise they could become full 
employees but not members, an untenable situation). This rarely happened though 
as probationers either achieved the standard or voluntarily left the organisation prior 
to the vote, typically due to disliking cooperative working or avoiding the shame of 
rejection.  
“People do get rejected; yes it is an interesting one because I think if they do 
they know about it quite early on. They don’t gel. They end up pulling out of it 
before it comes to the vote, but some people do get to vote and don’t make it 
in… it’s just democracy at the end of the day. You can literally rub someone 
up the wrong way and it won’t happen for you but people generally do try.” 
(Coop1, member 1). 
This approval method was different to the other types of EO where the selection 
decision was taken by a small number of people, possibly even just one person. 
(Examples were seen in both direct-owned and trust-owned EOBs where a small, 
 11 
 
elected body voted on the appointment of the chairperson but nothing below that 
level). In large coops (e.g. Coop1) not everyone may know the probationer; this was 
mediated by rotating employees around departments and providing written feedback 
to all members. 
Recruiting members after a challenging probationary period helps to ensure a good 
organisational fit as was observed through very low staff turnover in all three WCs. 
This follows Gibson et al. (2006) understanding of maintaining the cultural status quo 
by recruiting and socialising new employees. Probationers were monitored against 
their adherence to the ICA's (2014) principles and not granted membership if they 
did not conform, hence the WCs culture was maintained and actively controlled by its 
current membership. However unlike a previous study, this attention to preventing 
‘culture mismatch’ led to above average increases in staff turnover in a directly-
owned EOB (Ridley-Duff, 2010). The WCs claim turnover levels a tenth of their 
industry averages. This attests to a member development process and induction 
strategy that is, perhaps, much more inclusive than those in direct and/or trust-
owned EOBs. 
Whilst this has the potential to create a homogenous workforce and possibly a 
monoculture (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986), the diversity within the workforce (e.g. 
sexuality, ethnicity and gender) was celebrated and actively championed in the WC 
case studies. For example, Coop1 took positive action in recruitment, with female 
members visiting schools to explain that they too drive forklift trucks. 
Shared values were extended to other aspects of life, for example travelling, the 
environment, workers’ rights and gender equality. Sobering et al. (2014) found that 
cooperatives promoted gender equality but did not necessarily achieve it, for 
historical rather than structural reasons. Whyte and Whyte (1988, p. 273) list the 
cooperative principle: "All human beings should be considered as having been 
created equal, with equal rights and obligations", in this sense, there was no 
distinction between gender. Job roles were distributed irrespective of race, gender, 
age or sexuality, within a variety of nationalities.  
“That is part of the democracy as well, so I think in the Co-op we have a gay 
and lesbian community that is quite important. I do not know how it is in other 
places but in here for some reason we have this huge representation of 
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lesbian and gay people. It makes the place more democratic as well, more 
diverse.” (Coop1, member 2). 
This ensures a wider representation of society is present during democratic debates 
with less exclusion. Importantly, democracy is not just having a vote but also who is 
able to take part in the process. By being more inclusive, cooperatives help to make 
a more democratic society (Ellerman, 1997). A previous ethnographic study (Ridley-
Duff, 2005, footnote 64) of a directly-owned EOB comparable in size to Coop1, noted 
an absence of lesbian and gay relationships during fieldwork and that post-fieldwork 
follow up revealed the active exclusion of the partners of lesbian and gay staff from 
company organised social events (verified by personal communication with author). 
This tentatively suggests that there is merit in studying whether UK-based WCs are 
more progressive on LGBT issues than other UK-based EOBs, and in a better 
position to end social exclusion.   
Self-ownership 
The flat organisational structure in all the cooperatives meant that either there were 
no managers, or everyone was a manager. Although there were roles and 
management committees that were empowered to execute the strategy of the 
membership, being a member of a WC allows for employee participation at the 
highest level, “Member-Driven Participation” (Ridley-Duff and Ponton, 2013). This 
involves frequent use of open meetings and online forums with democratic voting (or 
consensus decision-making) which allowed all members to decide what is discussed 
and express opinions. This deeply embedded level of democracy (with one person, 
one vote) was not as apparent at all levels of direct and trust-owned EOBs. However 
this increased participation was seen as a core part of the responsibility of being a 
WC member. As the Company Secretary of Coop Service describes, members who 
deliberately chose not to take part in membership meetings faced the sanction of 
losing membership: 
"We have just changed all our constitution, our domestic rules if you like, to 
say that if you don’t turn up for 50% of the meetings in the year then you will 
lose your membership." (Coop Service, Company secretary). 
Practical steps were taken to enable members to confidently engage with meetings. 
This included training in public speaking as well as opportunities to debate in smaller 
groups which were less intimidating. During probation Coop2 members had to 
present a new product to their colleagues solely for the purpose of learning to speak 
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in larger groups and thus developing the “economic democracy” skills that Summers 
and Chillas (2019) refer to. Pateman (1970) also agrees that individuals should 
receive training in democracy. Expressing an opinion was valued and desired, 
although it could not be forced, since that would be making members do something 
that they did not want.  
Bernstein (1980) stated that a “particular set of attitudes and values” was required for 
workplace democracy to take place. The company secretary of Coop Service argued 
that ‘getting people to the meetings’ was the minimum level of ‘democratic 
participation’ acceptable. This raises a point of departure with Ridley-Duff and 
Ponton (2013) notion of ‘member-led participation’ since a policy requiring 
attendance was regarded by employees, in their study, as anti-democratic. This goes 
against their concept of a workplace democracy as one that maximises members 
self-control over their participation in management. 
Unlike directly-owned and trust-owned EOBs, all the WCs researched had nominal 
£1 shares. This made joining easy and reduced the personal liability. Therefore, 
whilst the stress of financial ownership was low (unlike direct ownership - potentially 
50% of salary) the stress of responsibility for the WC could still be high (similar to 
findings in Rothschild and Whitt, 1986 and less so in trust-owned). There was no 
higher management level to apportion blame or take responsibility in the 
organisation. 
“We don’t have a shared adversary. We don’t have a boss , ‘that bastard up in 
that bloody office, I hate that twat!’ We all have different adversaries and it 
can be each other” (Coop1, member 3).  
Members who were not used to taking significant strategic decisions had to vote and 
accept the collective decisions. Each member had direct involvement in the running 
of the business and the responsibilities that it incurred, as well as the rewards rather 
than deferring to an unelected management structure. This issue of engagement 
provides a dilemma in light of earlier evidence that people do not always want more 
involvement and participation, and can desire to be less involved in some aspects of 
the organisation (Ridley-Duff and Ponton, 2011, 2013). Is constantly pressing 
individuals for greater participation, which is against the wishes of the members, a 
promotion or degradation of workplace democracy? 
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All three WCs expressed stress through interpersonal relationships at work. Pierce et 
al. (1991, p. 141) states,  
“[a] joint responsibility for organizational failure entails a personal cost. It will, 
for example, be more difficult for the employee-owner than for the non-
integrated employee (or non-integrated employee-owner) to walk away from 
work at night and leave organizational problems and decisions at the door.” 
Opinions were expressed with passion and forcefulness which could be viewed as 
aggressive. Jaumier (2016) refers to the power of members over the executive board 
and this was observed at Coop1: 
“The first item on the agenda was open forum. This enabled any member to 
stand up and say anything about anything. Immediately one member stood up 
and explained his serious misgivings with the way in which the current 
[project] implementation was going. He called for an immediate cessation of 
the project as well as for the management committee to step down 
immediately.”  (Field notes from Coop1 at the QGM). 
Intergroup conflict is not necessarily harmful to organisational performance but can 
become an issue when there is too little or too much (Gibson et al., 2006). 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986, p. 167) quote Olivarius who found that from a survey of 
400 producer coops in the UK there was a strong correlation between "economic 
vitality and the degree to which decisions making procedures are democratic”, 
confirming the need for robust debate. 
Self-control 
Alongside self-ownership, there was a performance expectation of "self-control" 
within all three WCs. This was also observed in the directly-owned EOBs but less so 
in the trust where employees were one step removed from direct ownership. 
Members were expected to work hard, contributing to the organisation and not 
abusing their position. This extended to their own self-management, recognising 
what was required and making it happen, without being told what to do. This 
philosophy is reliant upon a high degree of honesty and trust, which must be 
demonstrated during the probationary period. Not having a senior management 
decision-making process diffuses the recognition of individuals who are equal in 
terms of power and status. 
Everybody is self-motivated, they all know it is their company, if they don’t pull 
the weight, they know they’re letting themselves down and anyone else down. 
(Coop Service, Company secretary). 
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However, once membership status was attained, withdrawing it was difficult. This 
can lead to “free riding”, enjoying the benefits without contributing towards the effort 
required. Bohr (2014) suggests that people with low trust levels are less likely to 
contribute to collective goals because of the fear of being abused. Social exclusion 
and internal shame were used against members who were not contributing but there 
was also recognition that sometimes people did not know the reasons why members 
might not perform. 
We are not very good at criticising each other; we tend to expect each other to 
be getting on with the job. (Coop2, member 2). 
Not much is done […] there are people who are considered that they don’t pull 
their weight, piss takers and all the rest of it. It is just “okay, fine, be it on their 
own conscience”. It is not a sore subject. (Coop1, member 3). 
360-degree performance appraisals were carried out in Coop1 and Coop2. In 
Coop1, members selected 15 other members to comment on their performance and 
for Coop2 the entire membership fed back annually on each member. This depth of 
response was not seen in either direct or trust-owned EOBs which typically just 
relied upon the line manager’s opinion. The feedback was collated by the HR 
representative and anonymised during a face to face interview. Coop Service chose 
to appraise members by their hard-metric performance outcomes (the “What” e.g. 
time to fix) rather than how it was done, giving the member autonomy to manage 
their job, in the way they saw fit, rather than dictated to by higher management. This 
raises the possibility that appraising the “how” is a characteristic more often found in 
direct- and trust-owned EOBs. 
Secure employment 
The WCs saw secure employment for current and future members as a core belief, 
beneficial for members and society. This was less apparent in the trust-owned EOB 
where significant redundancies had taken place. Waddell and Burton (2006) 
recognise the benefits of ‘good work’ (described as healthy, safe, providing individual 
influence and a sense of self-worth) and therefore employment. The WCs prioritised 
employment over wealth generation. Secure, affordable, maximised regular pay 
within the constraints of a viable business was considered better than optimising the 
profit share and paying lower wages. External wage comparisons to market rates 
were less relevant (than direct and trust-owned). Instead, paying a wage that 
enabled people to thrive within their local community was key. A permanent salary 
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allowed members to access mortgages and reduced the need for government 
intervention in alleviating poverty (Austin, 2014). Since the cooperatives had no 
external shareholders, all surplus generated was shared amongst its members. 
“There is nobody here on working tax credits or extra benefits from the 
government. Whereas [supermarket chain] pay everybody a minimum wage 
and they are all claiming working tax credits, so we are contributing massively 
to our local economy… because we pay people a fair wage” (Coop1, member 
3). 
Pay differentials were minimised as far as possible, whilst being able to recruit 
appropriate members. For Coop1 and Coop2 this was achieved through setting a 
single pay rate for all members (nett and gross respectively). Therefore, some 
specialist roles were paid significantly less than the market rate (e.g. HR director) 
and some manual roles were paid above (e.g. warehouse picker). Offsetting this, 
members rotated around two or three roles which also provided greater variety and 
reduced stress (this level of rotation was not observed in other forms of EOB). 
“I get a day playing, here in the toy room [warehouse] on all the toys [forklifts, 
electric pallet movers]” (Coop1, member 3, Sales account representative and 
warehouse operative). 
With flat pay scales at Coop1 and Coop2 there was no opportunity to use pay as a 
retention tool (unlike direct and trust-owned EOBs where pay bands and 
performance related pay was available). Where members desired greater pay, the 
only options were to increase hours or resign. To recruit technical staff Coop Service 
had to pay a wage premium to engineers, but the share dividend was divided equally 
amongst members, irrespective of role or hours worked. 
The priority was for employment to be ensured for future co-operative members. 
Therefore, a proportion of profit was re-invested (for example purchasing premises) 
rather than distributing it to the current membership. This was rationalised as more 
than simple business logic but a genuine desire to ensure that there would be 
employment for future generations, a demonstration of a particular kind of 
philanthropy not seen elsewhere. As Coop Service’s Company Secretary remarked: 
“No we are here to keep people in work - that’s our main thing. We are here 
for employment, yes. It is nice to make a profit but if we don’t make massive 
profits then it is not, you know, it’s more about being here next year. Same as 
when we bought the building, it is more about the future generations that are 
going to work here.” (Coop Service, Company secretary). 
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This influenced the decision whether to employ temporary workers. Whyte and 
Whyte (1988) point out, when a cooperative becomes successful the membership 
may choose to only recruit non-members so that the profit is shared amongst a 
smaller pool of members – a form of “collective selfishness”. This tension was 
observed at Coop1, but it then recreates the owner/worker hegemonic situation that 
cooperatives actively seek to replace (Erdal, 2011). As field notes from Coop1 
reveal: 
“One member expressed his concern about the high rate of casual workers 
that were being employed as this was “ethically denying permanent jobs for 
people” and that temporary people are unable to get mortgages and 
participate in society as they would like to.” (Field notes from Coop1 QGM.) 
Redundancy was viewed as an anathema and priority was given to maintaining 
employment of all existing members. McDonnell et al. (2012, p. 39) give an example 
from Mondragón in 2009 where members voted for a 9% salary reduction rather than 
make members redundant.  
The observed culture of a whole life perspective, consistently shared values, self-
ownership, self-control and secure employment was seen to have implications for 
human resource management in WCs. These are discussed below. 
Implications and Conclusions 
By answering the question: 
How can attitudes to performance and reward management in worker 
cooperatives contribute to an understanding of the impact of EO on 
organisation culture? 
this study provides a series of insights. As Rothschild and Whitt (1986) found, WCs 
recruit members who appreciate cooperative principles (ICA, 2014) and this both 
enhances their capacity to take a ‘whole life’ approach to work, but also comes with 
additional stresses. The principles provide a strong foundation for the evaluation of 
shared values which is self-perpetuating and decreases staff turnover but is also 
likely to reduce the recruitment pool. This papers findings on WCs supports Davis’ 
(2004, p. 50) contention that “Being a cooperative is one of the advantages you have 
[for] attracting people who are committed to sustainable development and justice”. 
Not only did we find stronger commitment to voice rights in WCs compared to other 
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types of EOB, we also found the strongest commitments to flexibility (work-life 
integration), autonomy (self-control) and secure employment for current and future 
generations. Combined with provisions in each case for sharing financial surpluses 
equitably, WCs have a culture that represents a distinct approach to ‘total reward’ 
(Kaplan, 2005). This could be communicated more effectively in policy 
recommendations on EO (Nuttall, 2012). 
Where WCs have a flat pay level (such as at Coop1 and Coop2), there is no scope 
for personal pay progression. Progress is only made through collectively agreed 
increases due to business expansion and increasing profitability. The lack of career 
development, as opposed to role development, can limit the selection pool to those 
who are content with their situation. In this study, this favoured mature home-owners 
or younger members without dependents who were happy to try something different 
before (potentially) having to leave the organisation. However, the findings suggest 
that if they make it to membership, they are highly unlikely to leave. 
Mondragón are known to have low wage differentials (starting at 3:1) and maintain 
low turnover, so one recommendation for WCs could be to consider a solidarity pay 
ratio under democratic control to widen the recruitment pool without losing a strong 
sense of solidarity. Also, as Coop Service shows and Bernstein (1980) observed, 
there can be pragmatic considerations for specific high-skills workforce members. 
The implications for HR policies are far reaching. It goes against the presumed 
wisdom of pay-scales and differentiated benefits for staff with more responsibility 
and/or length of service (Armstrong, 2015). In this study, there is a positive link 
between an organisation culture that produces exceptional levels of staff turnover 
and a cultural shift in employee relations (ER) practice that contributes directly to 
tackling inequality and poverty in wider society. It did this sufficiently well to save the 
state money (compare to Austin, 2014) and maximises the potential of business to 
reduce poverty, even compared to other types of EO. The public policy benefit of 
WCs, therefore, are understated as they can help to reduce the dependence of low-
paid workers on state benefits. They could – with policy efforts to support an 
expanded sector, as is the case in Italy (Erdal, 2011) – contribute to substantial 
reductions in state expenditure on welfare and help to shape the economic 
environment (Cheney, 1999). 
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In this study, the performance-reward link enabled an increasing number of 
members to improve their lives, access mortgages and secure better housing. Over 
time (as found in Whyte and Whyte, 1988; Erdal, 2011), the policy of prioritising 
secure employment for current and future generations influences investment strategy 
and leads to a gradual and steady expansion of the cooperatives. The willingness to 
prioritise job security (including wage reductions that prevented redundancies) 
compares positively with the findings of McDonnell et al. (2012). This is further 
evidence of a new logic, putting people’s welfare before profitability, but – importantly 
– it is not inconsistent with a steadily growing sector, and therefore has added value 
as a public policy. 
Operationalising HR policy in a WC context, therefore, requires a revision of ‘best 
practice’ in HR textbooks. In the context of WCs, financial stresses cannot be met 
with rounds of redundancies. The cultural norm within WCs is a clear preference for 
(temporary) reductions in pay levels to protect as many jobs as possible. In such a 
culture, the decision to terminate employment shifts from the corporation to the 
individual. Members who cannot sustain themselves on a lower income can choose 
to leave, but the corporate body does not force people to leave employment. The 
role of ER specialists in a WC, therefore, is to protect the cultural norm of self-control 
and self-responsibility and ensure that overall wage levels are maintained at a 
sustainable level given prevailing trading conditions. ER practice in WCs is to charge 
individuals with responsibility for responding to any hardship created by deteriorating 
trading conditions.  
This finding means there will be an ongoing tension between the pay policies that 
enable WCs to be resilient and protect jobs and the prevailing norms in employment 
law regarding fixed wages. In a conventional capitalist firm, the employee reward of 
wages is forfeit permanently if there is a wage reduction. In WCs, the forfeit is 
temporary, because any increase in profitability that occurs after a wage reduction 
can be returned to workers through sharing surpluses. Therefore, public policy 
support for carefully crafted variable wage policies would be helpful to WCs (Ridley-
Duff, 2005; Erdal, 2011). 
In this sample of WCs, the cultural norm also stressed working hard and not abusing 
personal autonomy. Probation processes were used to identify and remove (i.e. vote 
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out) ineffective workers before they became members. It is unclear whether the low 
turnover rates claimed by the WCs applied only to members, or both members and 
non-members, so further studies are warranted to improve knowledge of the 
subtleties of WC processes. Nevertheless, both WCs and other types of EOB 
claimed staff turnover well below industry averages, providing a strong indication that 
their cultures are focused on employee well-being, and not maximising profitability at 
workers’ expense. 
To conclude, this paper contributes to our understanding of how three different forms 
of EO (cooperative, direct and trust) impact upon organisational culture. In the WC 
approach to EO, five significant values were identified after inductive analysis: a 
whole life perspective, consistently shared values, self-ownership, self-control and 
secure employment. WCs placed the highest value on secure employment for both 
current members and future generations within a culture that enabled each member 
to bring their whole being to work and be justly rewarded. Members are recruited and 
selected on the basis of their alignment and commitment to co-operative values and 
principles, with an emphasis on self-leadership and self-control. As no member is 
granted the authority to manage others, the culture circumvents the need for 
managers telling (other) staff what to do, and avoids the social conflict and offence 
produced by managerialist culture (Willmott, 1993).  
These cultural norms were sustained by a comprehensive probationary period 
organised by existing members which requires a great deal of trust and grants the 
individual significant freedom of expression (which is then judged by the entire 
membership of the WC at the end of the probationary period). Membership of a WC 
entails not only a commitment to work co-operatively but also a desire for the wider 
social transformation envisioned by both founders of the cooperative movement and 
recent advocates of EO (Ellerman, 1997; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010 and Erdal, 
2011). In this context, the framing of HR as a field of practice changes, and the 
demands on HR staff regarding their approach to employment relations shifts to the 
‘radical’ paradigm identified by Fox (1966).  
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